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STUDENT COMMENT
Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica
ELIZABETH K. HOOK*
Special problems are presented by the potential for criminal
conduct in Antarctica. Various modes for asserting criminal juris-
diction are discussed, and the author concludes that a novel ap-
proach is required. The author proposes the creation of a multi-
national tribunal, which would incorporate certain traditional
aspects of international courts but would also be designed to meet
the unique needs of Antarctica.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The vast, ice-covered continent of Antarctica has been an area
of steadily increasing interest and activity throughout the twentieth
century. Since Antarctic activities promise to multiply and diversify
in the future, with concomitant population increase, the question of
control of criminal conduct in Antarctica has become more pressing.
Antarctica has been subjected to multiple and conflicting sov-
ereignty claims, the status of which are undetermined. During the
twentieth century, seven states have staked claims to areas compris-
ing approximately eighty percent of Antarctica.' The claimants, and
the dates on which their claims were advanced are: Argentina
(1942), Australia (1933), Chile (1940), France (1924), New Zealand
* Former Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. See Bilder, Control of Criminal Conduct in Antarctica, 52 VA. L. REV. 231, 235 (1966).
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(1923), Norway (1939) and the United Kingdom (1908).2 The claims
of the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile overlap considerably
with respect to areas of the Palmer Peninsula, the Antarctic region
closest to South America. The sector known as Marie Bird Land and
the inner core of the Norwegian sector remain unclaimed.3
The status of these claims has been the subject of international
conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union refuse to recognize
claims by any state; each has also refrained from making any claims
to sovereignty while reserving all rights which may stem from their
activities in Antarctica.' The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zea-
land, France and Norway appear to recognize each others' claims.5
Meanwhile, the rivalry between the United Kingdom, Argentina
and Chile over their overlapping claims is intense and has been the
source of considerable friction.' These claims have been frozen tem-
porarily by the Antarctic Treaty,' entered into by all claimant states
and several nonclaimant states in order to foster peaceful scientific
research. However, while the Treaty obviates overt territorial dis-
putes for the present, claimant states have been alerted by the
dormant status of their claims to guard against their possible ex-
tinction.
This comment will review the problems inherent in criminal
jurisdiction in Antarctica. Those problems are created by the dis-
puted status of Antarctic territorial claims and are likely to be exac-
erbated by increased human activity on the southern continent.
Since jurisdiction is closely linked conceptually with sovereignty,
the universally significant goal of control of criminal conduct in
2. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
144, 145 (1959).
3. See, e.g., Comment, Quick Before it Melts: Toward a Resolution of the Jurisdictional
Morass in Antarctica, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 175 (1976). See also P. JESSUP & H.
TAUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 153.
4. See Comment, supra note 3, at 175 n.9, 176 n.11. The United States has explicitly
reserved the right to assert a territorial claim. See United States Invitation to Twelve Nation
Antarctic Conference, May 2, 1958, reprinted in President's Special Report on United States
Policy and International Cooperation in Antarctica, H.R. Doc. No. 358, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
23 (1964).
5. See generally G. HAYTON, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN ANTARCTICA (1959).
6. A series of exchanges over the dispute was carried on through diplomatic channels
from 1947 to 1955. For a partial collection of these exchanges, see 5 POLAR RECORD 228-40
(1948), 6 POLAR RECORD 415-18 (1952) and 7 POLAR RECORD 212-26 (1954). The tension has,
on occasion, nearly ripened into overt conflict. See, e.g., Hambro, Some Notes on the Future
of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 217, 218 n.5 (1974). A British attempt
to bring such a dispute before the International Court of Justice failed when Argentina and
Chile refused to recognize the court's jurisdiction. See P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note
2, at 150.
7. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter cited as Antarctic Treaty].
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Antarctica may become a pawn in the struggles surrounding terri-
torial claims. A solution must be found which will lead to control
of criminal behavior while avoiding further complication of the sov-
ereignty issue.
II. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
The conflicts created by international discord over the claims to
Antarctic territories were set in abeyance with the conclusion of the
Antarctic Treaty in 1959. Inspired laigely by the success of the
International Geophysical Year [I.G.Y.] (1957-58) in furthering
international scientific collaboration,' twelve states met in Wash-
ington in 1959 to conclude the Antarctic Treaty.' The Treaty was
designed to promote cooperative international scientific investiga-
tion and to ensure that Antarctica be used solely for peaceful pur-
poses. 0 The Treaty bans all military activity and provides for free-
dom of scientific investigation and exchange of scientific informa-
tion.
In years prior to the Treaty, certain claimant states had op-
posed suggestions for the internationalization of Antarctica. 2 The
Treaty dealt with this sovereignty dispute by simply tabling the
issue; all claims and postures as to claims are preserved unaltered;
Article IV stipulates that the Treaty will not be interpreted as a
"renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted
rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica." Recogni-
tion and nonrecognition stances are preserved and "acts or activi-
ties" taking place while the Treaty is in force cannot constitute a
basis for future assertions or denials of claims. In addition, new
8. See, e.g., Hambro, supra note 6, at 218-19.
9. The contracting states were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States. To date, the states acceding to the Treaty under Article XIII are Brazil, Czechoslova-
kia, Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 260 (1977), and, since Sept. 11, 1978, Bulgaria, 78 DEP'T
STATE BULL. No. 2020, at 56 (Nov. 1978).
10. The Treaty Preamble provides a fitting introduction to the agreement:
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue
forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the
scene or object of international discord; Acknowledging the substantial contribu-
tions to scientific knowledge resulting from international cooperation in scientific
investigation in Antarctica . ...
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, Preamble.
11. Id. arts. 1, 11, 111.
12. See P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 174. For a discussion of the United
States proposal of 1948 for internationalization of Antarctica and the response it drew from
various claimant states, see Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 436,
436-44 (1960). For a discussion of counterproposals and subsequent exchanges of views prior
to the Treaty convention, see id. at 444-63.
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claims and enlargement of existing claims are prohibited for the
duration of the Treaty.)3
As a result of its interrelation with the sovereignty issue, the
thorny problem of jurisdiction was also left relatively untouched by
the Treaty. Article VIII(1) provides that contracting parties shall
have jurisdiction over their own nationals who are either observers
(as designated under Article VII) or scientific personnel (exchanged
pursuant to Article Ifl(l)(b)) and their staffs. 4 Any disputes regard-
ing jurisdiction over individuals not covered by Article VIII(l) are
to be solved by consultation among the concerned states. Military
personnel may be covered by specific military codes.'3 However,
most scientific and support personnel, tourists and civilian staff and
crews that may be engaged in future resource exploration or exploi-
tation are not covered by the Treaty." The Treaty, therefore, makes
13. Article IV provides:
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights
of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether or as a
result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recogni-
tion or non-recognition of any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sover-
eignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antectica
shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
14. Article VIII provides:
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present Treaty,
and without prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relat-
ing to jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under
paragraph 1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under subparagraph
l(b) of Article III of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such
persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which
they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in
Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pend-
ing the adoption of measures in pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article IX, the
Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise
of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a view to
reaching a mutually acceptable solution.
Id. art. VIII.
15. United States military personnel, for example, are subject to United States law
wherever they are pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1976). The statute, by its terms, "applies in all places." Id. § 805.
16. Civilians, in United States activities at least, represent an ever-increasing portion
of the population of Antarctica. Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration,
JVol. 33:489
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no jurisdictional provision for a significant proportion of the Ant-
arctic population.
Anticipating the recurrence of jurisdictional questions, the
Treaty parties did, however, make specific provision for discussion
of such questions at the future meetings between parties mandated
by Article IX(1).11
Whatever discussions may occur in the future, jurisdiction to
control criminal conduct in Antarctica by any state is at present
shrouded in uncertainty. If levelled at any individual other than a
national of the asserting state, such an assertion would almost cer-
tainly encounter opposition. Those states which do not currently
recognize claims to territorial sovereignty are unlikely to counte-
nance exercise of jurisdiction over their nationals by claimants
where such exercise is based on sovereignty." Nor are claimants
likely to surrender territorial jurisdiction to other states, lest such
surrender serve as an apparent diminution of their claims.
Citizenship and International Law on H.R. 763, H.R. 6148 and H.R. 7842, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 56 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings].
17. Article IX(1) provides:
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the
present Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the
date of entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and
places, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters
of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering,
and recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the princi-
ples and objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding:
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
(c) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica;
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in
Article VII of the Treaty;
(e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica;
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. IX(1).
18. For example, during a congressional hearing, Robert C. Brewster, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Oceans, International Environment and Scientific Affairs (OES),
stated: "The United States has not made, and does not recognize, territorial claims by any
state in Antarctica. Accordingly, we believe that no state may assert criminal jurisdiction
over persons committing crimes in Antarctica on the basis of the territorial sovereignty." 1977
Hearings, supra note 16, at 63. Similarly, during the same hearing, the following interchange
took place between Joshua Eilberg, Chairman of the Subcommittee, and James H. Michel,
Assistant Legal Advisor of the Department of State:
MR. EILBERG: Would we [the United States] protest the assertion of jurisdiction
over a U.S. citizen by a foreign government, for example, New Zealand, where
such jurisdiction is predicted [sic] on a foreign claim that we do not recognize?
MR. MICHEL: Since the U.S. does not recognize claims of territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica, we would object to any exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica based
on a territorial claim . . ..
Id. at 66.
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11I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Each of the seven claimant states has either enacted specific
legislation covering criminal conduct in Antarctica or apparently
considers its domestic criminal legislation to be applicable to its
Antarctic claims." The claimants apparently base their assertion
of criminal jurisdiction on a natural extension of their claimed terri-
torial sovereignty. As suggested above, however, it is likely that such
an attempt to assert jurisdiction over an individual other than a
national of the claimant state would evoke protest.
Nonclaimant states have evinced varying degrees of vigilance
in anticipating criminal misdeeds by their nationals in Antarctica.
On one end of the spectrum, South Africa has enacted specific legis-
lation applying its domestic criminal legislation to South. Africans
in Antarctica. In the median range, certain states such as Japan
and the Soviet Union, although not directly addressing the problem
of criminal jurisdiction in Antarctica, generally " 'consider at least
certain of their criminal laws as applicable to extraterritorial con-
duct of their own nationals wherever they may be.' "2" At the other
extreme, the United States currently has no law concerning criminal
offenses specifically applicable to its civilians in Antarctica.22
In short, the present state of affairs is chaotic. Although there
appear to have been no major criminal incidents in Antarctica,2
increased human activities in the area may enhance the likelihood
of crime. At present, there are at least forty permanent operational
scientific research stations in Antarctica. 24 In addition to a contin-
19. See Bilder, supra note 1, at 260 nn. 87, 89, 91, 93, 94.
20. See id. at 260 n:95.
21. Id. at 262 n.98 (citing e.g., GERMAN PENAL CODE § 3; GREEK CODE OF PENAL PROCEDURE
§ 3; INDIAN PENAL CODE § 4).
22. Professor Bilder, in his excellent and comprehensive article, pointed to the gap in
federal legislation which leaves the United States without criminal law applicable to its
civilian citizens in Antarctica. Professor Bilder suggested that the situation could be corrected
by an amendment to title 18 of the United States Code incorporating by' reference those
activities made offenses if engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
For the draft of his proposed amendment, see id. at 284.
In July 1977, the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International
Law, held a hearing on, inter alia, two nearly identical bills-H.R. 6148 and H.R.
7842-which would carry out Professor Bilder's suggested amendment of title 18. The two
bills also contain sections delineating procedures for apprehension, restraint, search and
seizure, etc. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 16, at 15-24.
Testimony at the Hearing indicated that the Departments of State and Justice, and the
National Science Foundation, favor passage of such an amendment to title 18.
23. 1977 Hearings, supra note 16, at 37, 56; N.M. MEYERS, Operational Considerations:
New Legal Issues, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE POLAR RECIONS 25 (G.
Schatz ed. 1974); Bilder, supra note 1, at 232.
24. H. KING, THE ANTARCTIC app. D. (1970).
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ued expansion of scientific programs, 25 diversification of human ac-
tivity in the southern region is imminent.
The possibility of exploitable mineral resources in Antarctica
has drawn increasing attention. 6 Tourism, to a limited extent, has
existed for some time on the continent and may be expected to
expand in the future.Y It has also been suggested that there may
soon be trans-Antarctic routes for commercial aviation.21 Commer-
cial harvesting of the enormous krill population in the Southern
Ocean has begun and may prove a significant source of animal
protein .2 Support facilities for fishery-related operations may even
be established in the near future on the continent itself.
In sum, the scope and complexity of human involvement in
Antarctica is growing. As the population shifts to include tourists
and employees of private ventures, who may riot be as carefully
screened and highly disciplined as scientific and :military person-
nel," it would seem unduly sanguine to depend on a continued
absence of criminal activity as a solution.
The issue of precisely who has jurisdiction over criminal behav-
ior in Antarctica is largely irrelevant to the ultimate objec-
tive-maintenance of order. Nevertheless, the jurisdictional issue is
of strategic importance in the sovereignty dispute. The problem,
therefore, is to devise a system for control of -criminal behavior
which has minimal ramifications for the sovereignty dispute.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Before addressing the specific problem of crime in Antarctica,
a brief discussion of jurisdiction under international law is in order.
25. The U.S. Antarctic Research Program, Fiscal Year 1978, Budget Estimate to the
Congress, reprinted in 1977 Hearings, supra note 16, at 148-58, provides a good summary of
current United States scientific activities. For a discussion of scientific activities in Antarc-
tica, see.Gould, Antarctica-Continent of International Science, 150 SCIENCE 1775 (1965).
26. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 16, at 149; N.M. MEYERS, supra note 23, at 33; Alexan-
der, A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic Resource Problem,.33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371
(1978); Hambro, supra note 6, at 221-22.
27. 1977 Hearings, supra note 16, at 61. Dr. Edward P. Todd, Acting Assistant Director,
Astronomical, Atmospheric, Earth and Ocean Sciences, National Science Foundation, testi-
fied that: "Last year there were 400 or 500 tourists who visited some part of Antarctica as a
result of the tourist service." See P. JEssuP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 165; N. M.
MEYERS, supra note 23, at 33.
28. See P. JEssup & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 166.
29. Shapley, Antarctic Problems: Tiny Krill to Usher in New Resources Era, 196 SCIENCE
503 (1977). Krill are small shrimp-like crustaceans which abound in enormous numbers in
the Southern Ocean. Although the size of the total krill stock is not yet known, an estimate
places the total biomass at perhaps one billion metric tons. Id. at 504. See also 1977 Hearings,
supra note 16, at 149.
30. See, e.g., 1977 Hearings, supra note 16, at 60.
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There are several jurisdictional principles which have emerged and,
to varying degrees, have been accepted under customary interna-
tional law.:"
The territorial principle bases jurisdiction on the locus of the
offense, allowing a state to control behavior within its boundaries.
This principle has been extended to allow a state to assert jurisdic-
tion over crimes executed beyond its territory but having substan-
tial and direct effects within that territory. 2
The nationality principle gives a state jurisdiction over its own
nationals regardless of their locus. Competence to prosecute and
punish is based solely on nationality."3
The protective principle is based on the necessity of allowing a
state to protect certain national interests against injurious acts.
States are thus allowed to assert jurisdiction over crimes against
their security, integrity or independence, regardless of their locus."
The universality principle determines "jurisdiction by refer-
ence to the custody of the person committing the offense."3" Any
state may exercise jurisdiction over perpetrators of universal crimes,
the earliest and most firmly established of which is piracy. 8 This
type of jurisdiction is generally considered residuary and is exer-
cised principally where extradition has been offered but refused by
the state of the offender.
The passive personality principle determines jurisdiction by
reference to the victim's nationality. 3 This principle has limited
acceptance and its application has been forcefully opposed by cer-
tain states.38
The principles of territoriality and nationality are universally
accepted. Territoriality in all cases is of primary importance, since
it embodies fundamental notions of territorial sovereignty and
equality among sovereigns. The protective principle is invoked by
most states; and universality is fairly widely accepted as a source
of residual jurisdiction. The passive personality principle, as noted
above, is regarded with some disfavor.
31. For an excellent analysis of criminal jurisdiction under international law, see
Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L
L. Supp. 435 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research].
32. Id. at 487, 488.
33. Id. at 519.
34. Id. at 543.
35. Id. at 445.
36. See text accompanying notes 85-88 infra.
37. Harvard Research, supra note 31, at 445.
38. Id. at 445. See also Bilder, supra note 1, at 272, 273.
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V. A PREVIOUS SUGGESTION
Difficulties inhere in any exercise of jurisdiction based on terri-
toriality in Antarctica due to the disputed nature of the claims and
the fact that certain territories remain unclaimed. It has been sug-
gested that criminal jurisdiction in Antarctica be based primarily
on the nationality of the perpetrator with subsidiary jurisdiction
lying in the victim's state. Absent exercise by either the perpetra-
tor's state or the-victim's state, jurisdiction would be vested in any
contracting party to the Antarctic Treaty. 9 A mode of implementa-
tion for this jurisdictional scheme has been posited as an amend-
ment to Article VIII of the Treaty. 0
Such a proposal is commendable for its simplicity and the rela-
tive mechanical ease with which it might be implemented. While
the Antarctic population remains small and relatively homogeneous
and the incidence of crime remains low, it may be the most practi-
cal, workable solution. There are, howeyer, certain immediate and
long range difficulties with the scheme.
The most immediate problem would be in securing ratification
for such an amendment,4'1 particularly since amendment of the
Treaty may be effected only through unanimous agreement of the
contracting parties. 2 Proposals at the Treaty conference to vest ex-
clusive jurisdiction in each state over its own nationals were opposed
by certain of the claimants who feared that such a provision might
diminish the status of their sovereignty claims.43 There is no reason
to believe that claimants have become less vigilant over the status
of their claims, particularly since estimates of the resource poten-
tials of Antarctica have become more promising. Furthermore, since
the present language of Article VIII(2) specifically relegates juris-
39. Comment, supra note 3, at 194-98. See also Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, G.A. Res. 3166 (XXVIII)
(1974).
40. In the case of acts or omissions that occur in Antarctica during the course
of this Treaty Regime, no person shall be subjected to the jurisdiction of any
State, other than:
1. the State or States of which he is a national; or
2. a State whose national has been injured by the act or omission in ques-
tion, provided the State or States referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article have
refused prosecution or have otherwise failed to assert jurisdiction; or
3. any Contracting Party, provided no other State is entitled to assert juris-
diction by virtue of paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article or all States referred to in
those paragraphs have either refused prosecution or otherwise failed to assert
jurisdiction.
Comment, supra note 3, at 197.
41. See id.
42. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. XII(1)(a).
43. Bilder, supra note 1, at 238 n.21.
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dictional disputes to the informal channels of mutual consultation,"'
a formal provision for exclusive jurisdiction over nationals might
easily be viewed as an admission by claimant states of their lack of
competence to exercise territorial jurisdiction. Currently, informal
channels leave the territorial jurisdictional competence question
open. Overt transition from informal channels to formal vesting of
competence on the basis of nationality closes the question by deny-
ing territorial jurisdictional competence. Difficulty may be antici-
pated, therefore, in securing claimant ratification of the proposed
amendment.
There are also certain practical considerations whose import-
ance may increase as the Antarctic population expands. A jurisdic-
tional scheme based largely on nationality presupposes the applica-
bility of national penal codes to the activities of individuals in Ant-
arctica. In the case of some states, such a premise is unfounded.,5
Such gaps could presumably be remedied by appropriate legisla-
tion. There remains, however, the question of the appropriateness
of application of national criminal codes to the unique setting of
Antarctica. National criminal codes anticipate local and immediate
enforcement mechanisms such as courts, detention facilities and
police forces. National criminal codes also proscribe a wide and
varying range of conduct that may or may not cover all possible
conduct in Antarctica. Furthermore, the sanctions of national crim-
inal codes may not be practicable in Antarctica.
Each state, in prosecuting criminal behavior in the Antarctic,
would either have to transport the alleged offender home for trial,
or locate a court in Antarctica." Transportation of the alleged of-
fender home would involve concomitant difficulties with preserva-
tion of evidence and transportation of witnesses. It would also con-
stitute a cumbersome and expensive operation, particularly in the
case of lesser offenses. Transportation of a court to Antarctica would
also prove expensive. Moreover, in the case of the United States, for
example, due process protections would still attach. 7 Establish-
ment of separate national courts in Antarctica by each state would
constitute a wasteful international duplication of effort in the small,
functionally-designed stations in Antarctica.
Therefore, establishing criminal jurisdiction in Antarctica on
44. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. VIII(2).
45. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
46. For discussion of, and comment upon, the practical problems entailed in a jurisdic-
tional scheme of this sort, see 1977 Hearings, supra note 16, at 34-36, 59.
47. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which held that the panoply of fifth amend-
ment due process rights are guaranteed to United States civilians tried by United States
tribunals abroad. The difficulties may arise, for example, in assuring other constitutional
safeguards, e.g., the empaneling of an impartial jury.
I Vol. 33:489
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the basis of nationality principles is by no means a panacea. There
are, however, other possibilities for the future.
VI. A PROPOSED CODE
A. Uniform Provisions
It should be noted that unique geographical settings may call
for special standards of conduct. This concept was recognized by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Escamilla,45 a case involving manslaughter on an un-
claimed ice island in the Arctic called T-3. The court remarked:
Gross negligence or even simple negligence is to be determined
by all of the facts and circumstances surrounding an act which
is asserted to be either. It would seem plain that what is negligent
or grossly negligent conduct in the Eastern District of Virginia
may not be negligent or grossly negligent on T-3 when it is re-
membered that T-3 has no governing authority, no police force,
is relatively inaccessible from the rest of'the world, lacks medical
facilities and the dwellings thereon lack locks-in short, that ab-
sent self-restraint on the part of those stationed on T-3 and effec-
tiveness of the group leader, T-3 is a place where no recognized
means of law enforcement exists and each man must look to
himself for the immediate enforcement of his rights. Certainly, all
of these factors are ones which should be considered by a jury
given the problem of determining whether defendant was grossly
negligent. 9
Antarctica is a truly unique area of the earth. "To most people
it is as remote and mysterious as the Moon; indeed to many the
Moon may well seem more familiar if no less accessible."' The five
and one half million square miles of Antarctica are almost entirely,
covered by snow and ice sheets, and its temperatures are generally
sub-zero. The pack ice of the Southern Ocean surrounding the conti-
nent freezes solid in the winter months so the continent is accessible
by ship only for the few summer months of December through
March.' The scientific stations have been-custom designed to meet
the rigors and unique demands of Antarctic existence.
It is suggested, therefore, that what is needed is a special penal
code tailored to the actualities of Antarctic conditions.52 Such a code
48. 467 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1972).
49. Id. at 347.
50. H. KING, supra note 24, at 5.
51. See generally id.
52. The following description of part of the United States research program in Antarctica
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could be drafted with the assistance of those who have experienced
life in Antarctica first hand," and could fashion appropriate sanc-
tions in an area where imprisonment for all but crimes of violence
is highly impractical. Such a code could also take into account
behavior which may be unique to the Antarctic living experience.
The Antarctic Criminal Code, as noted below, could be made
applicable to behavior in Antarctica in several ways. Regardless of
the scheme selected for implementation, the Antarctic Criminal
Code itself is an indispensable facet of rational and equitable con-
trol of behavior in Antarctica. The standard of behavior required
should be uniform and should be appropriate for Antarctic living
conditions, irrespective of which state or tribunal exercises jurisdic-
tion to enforce sanctions against an individual for his behavior in
Antarctica. An Antarctic Criminal Code would put all individuals
in Antarctica on notice of the behavior required and would place
them on a parity interse. Present national criminal codes, with their
variations both in proscriptions and sanctions, would generate
confusion and inequity should such codes govern the behavior of
individuals on the basis of nationality.
B. Implementation
The Antarctic Criminal Code could be implemented in any of
three ways. First, it could be promulgated as a uniform penal code
for conduct in Antarctica and adopted by each state separately
through appropriate legislative procedures. The provisions of the
code could then be enforced under the jurisdictional scheme out-
lined in section V above. Through amendment to the Antarctic
Treaty, jurisdiction over behavior in Antarctica would vest initially
in the state of the perpetrator, secondly in the state of the victim,
and lastly in any Consultative Party. Although implementation of
the Antarctic Criminal Code under this scheme would scatter juris-
diction among many states, it would provide a uniform and appro-
priate standard of behavior. There would remain, however, the
is but one small example of the unique activity in Antarctica, underscoring the need for a
special criminal code. "The research is conducted at four antarctic stations, from remote
temporary field sites, and aboard two research ships. Remote sensing techniques, using satel-
lites, aircraft, rockets, balloons, and unmanned stations, are utilized in the conduct of the
research." 1977 Hearings, supra note 16, at 149.
While it is desirable to control interference with, or sabotage of, these activities and
equipment, it is unlikely that any national criminal code has an adequate provision to do so.
An Antarctic Criminal Code could take into account such unique activities and equipment
and have provisions creating sanctions for unauthorized interference therewith.
53. A committee to draft the Code could be nominated in a manner similar to that used
for nomination of judges to the International Court of Justice. For the precise procedure, see
I.C.J. STAT. arts. 4, 12.
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problems of enforcement and trial discussed in section V.
A second possible method for implementation is for the Con-
sultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty to enact the Code acting
as a condominium. A pooling of the claims and interests of the
Consultative Parties would create a sovereign, capable of legislating
for Antarctica on a territorial basis. The condominium, as sovereign,
could also set up appropriate courts and enforcement measures. The
idea of a condominium, however, has met with some opposition in
the past, and the Consultative Parties might not presently be able
to reach such an agreement.54 As a last resort, claimant states may
view formation of a condominium as a desirable bulwark against
internationalization or free access. Formation of such a condomi-
nium, however, would be a conclusive step towards renunciation of
exclusive sovereignty claims. Some claimants may perceive such a
step as unnecessary and unduly compromising at this time.55
The third possibility is to enact the Antarctic Criminal Code
by multilateral treaty open to all states. The treaty would create a
tribunal or tribunals to sit in Antarctica itself. This possibility will
be discussed in section VII below. First, however, the political rami-
fications of this proposal require discussion.
The enactment of the Antarctic Criminal Code by treaty, with
simultaneous construction and authorization of Antarctic tribunals,
is suggested primarily as an interim measure. It is intended to ter-
minate along with the Antarctic Treaty. It is also intended, as is the
Antarctic Treaty, to preserve the status of claims and stances taken
relative to them. It is thus designed to maximize the potential for
ratification by permitting both claimant and nonclaimant states to
participate without prejudicing their interests. In this manner, a
means for controlling criminal behavior in Antarctica can be estab-
lished until the sovereignty disputes are resolved.
The difficulty with this proposal is that a tribunal established
by treaty would be, in essence, an international tribunal. Claimants
may consequently fear that acquiescense in such a treaty would
contribute to eventual internationalization of Antarctica. The alter-
natives, however, are these: (1) claimant assertion of jurisdiction
over criminal acts in claimed territories (the consequential disputes
54. A condominium has been suggested as a solution to the Antarctic sovereignty dis-
pute. See, e.g., P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 179; Hambro, supra note 6, at
225. The condominium form of solution, however, has been specifically rejected by Chile. P.
JEssuP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 179.
55. Such claimants may be less than compelled by a great moral vision of Antarctica as
a predestined common space and, hence, may not feel obliged to scurry into a condominium
in an attempt to thwart destiny. See, e.g., Comment, Thaw in International Law? Rights in
Antarctica Under the Law of Common Space, 87 YALE L.J. 804 (1978).
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and reprisals, however, could perhaps trigger an undesirable chal-
lenge before the International Court of Justice); (2) the surrender
of jurisdiction to the state of the perpetrator or victim under the
scheme outlined in section VI (This possibility, like the proposed
treaty creating an Antarctic tribunal, may be construed as a tacit
partial surrender of sovereignty by claimants. However, this possi-
bility has no similar redeeming scheme for practical administration
and enforcement of justice); and (3) the formation of a condomi-
nium with the ability to prescribe and enforce law but with its
attendant abandonment of hope for recognition of exclusive sover-
eignty claims.
Thus, while claimants might fear ratification of an Antarctic
Criminal Code and Tribunal Treaty as a step towards internation-
alization, the alternatives are even less appealing. If, in the future,
internationalization becomes a significant threat, the condominium
alternative is always available. From the claimants' perspective,
however, the condominium alternative may be a last resort. If sover-
eignty claims are to be preserved, ratification of the Antarctic Crim-
inal Code and Tribunal Treaty, which at worst would only have
precedential value in some eventual internationalization, is cer-
tainly preferable to the absolute surrender of sovereignty to a con-
dominium.
In any event, the proposed treaty is not intended as a step
toward internationalization. It emulates the Antarctic Treaty,
which was formulated and ratified with a goal in mind-the promo-
tion of scientific research. The Antarctic Treaty was not intended
to internationalize Antarctica but, rather, temporarily to set aside
sovereignty disputes. The proposed treaty also has a goal-control
of criminal behavior in Antarctica during the dormancy period for
sovereignty disputes mandated by the Antarctic Treaty. Further-
more, the proposed treaty is meant only to solve the practical prob-
lem of criminal behavior control; it is not concerned with whether
Antarctica should be internationalized, turned over to the claimants
as sovereigns or made a condominium. While theoretical considera-
tions regarding the future of Antarctica may be the subject of long
international debate, they offer no assistance in solving the immedi-
ate problem of controlling criminal behavior.
In Sum, it is suggested that the proposed Criminal Code and
Tribunal Treaty offers an immediate and practical interim solution
to the problem of controlling criminal behavior in Antarctica in a





VII. PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE AND TRIBUNAL TREATY
The proposed treaty would, as previously mentioned, enact an
Antarctic Criminal Code and would establish a tribunal or tribunals
to sit in Antarctica itself. Since such a tribunal would be relatively
novel, several aspects of the idea merit discussion. A first set of
questions centers on the competence and jurisdiction of the tri-
bunal. A second set concerns the structure and organization of the
tribunal and such procedural safeguards as might be designed to
order its proceedings. Included in this latter discussion is the ques-
tion of the tribunal's jurisdiction vis-A-vis the jurisdiction of na-
tional courts.
A. Historical Precedents
The concept of enacting a penal code and court system by
treaty without relation to sovereignty is not without historical har-
binger. The Spitzbergen example presents an interesting analogy to
the situation in Antarctica. "The archipelago of Spitzbergen, an
area lying between northern Greenland and Franz Joseph Land,
totally lacking an indigenous population and relatively unsuited for
permanent habitation due to its arctic climate, was claimed from
time to time, with varying degrees of exclusiveness, by several Euro-
pean nations."" The area was claimed by the English and the Danes
early in the seventeenth century. The Dutch and French, under the
doctrine of freedom of the seas, also claimed access and right to
use.57 Initial concern, however, was mainly with whaling bases, and
as the whaling industry declined in the mid-seventeenth century,
the islands decreased in international importance until the nine-
teenth century. " The discovery of coal and iron beds in the latter
part of the nineteenth century resurrected interest in the islands. 9
Because several states were concerned, a conference was convened
at the invitation of the Norwegian government in 1910.
In 1912, a protocol of seventy-seven articles was formulated and
was intended, according to Jessup and Taubenfeld,
to meet the need for (1) obviating the disadvantages arising from
the lack of any legal order there; (2) the protection of the exploi-
tation of natural resources; (3) the preservation of the status of
56. P. JESsuP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 34. See also Lansing, A Unique Interna-
tional Problem, 11 Am. J. INT'L L. 763 (1917).
57. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 34.
58. Id. at 34, 35.
59. In the 1880's, Sweden, Norway, the United States and Britain set up mining opera-
tions or stated claims, and a Russian company secured an option on some Norwegian claims.
Id. at 35.
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terra nullius; and (4) the recognition, due to their share in the
discovery, their territorial proximity, their investments of their
scientific explorations, of the special concern of Russia, Sweden
and Norway in the legal organization of Spitzbergen10
The international regime proposed by the protocol was never
implemented, however, due to the onset of World War I and the
establishment, by treaty, of Norwegian sovereignty in 1920.61 The
proposed regime nonetheless had several interesting features for
purposes of the present discussion.
In the first instance:
Spitzbergen's neutrality was formally provided for and its status
as terra nullius was preserved-that is, no state was to be permit-
ted to annex it in whole or in part nor could it be subjected, in
any form, to the sovereignty of any Power. Natural and juristic
persons while at Spitzbergen retained their own nationality. 2
This state of affairs is closely analogous to the current situation
under the Antarctic Treaty." Antarctica is also neutralized pur-
suant to the Treaty by the Article I provision that it be used only
for peaceful purposes, and by the combined provisions of Articles IV
and X which preclude, for all practical purposes, any exercise of
sovereignty."
Under the Spitzbergen protocol, governing authority was
placed in the hands of an International Commission whose members
were to be appointed by certain signatories. 5 Control of criminal
conduct was specifically provided for. The Commission was given
the power to decree regulations for order and security. Major crimi-
nal acts were to be tried by the perpetrator's state of nationality.
Acts in violation of Spitzbergen regulations could be punished by
penalties decreed by the Commission (up to three months in jail or
60. Id. at 36.
61. Norway's sovereignty was, however, limited for purposes of military use and with
regard to equality of access. Id.
62. Id.
63. This is not to suggest that Antarctica is terra nullius. However, its status under the
Antarctic Treaty is certainly closer to terra nullius than terra cornmunis. No state may
exercise exclusive sovereignty for the duration of the Treaty; hence, the similarity to terra
nullius. The status under the Treaty in no way resembles terra communis, since that status
presupposes a common space that is at once internationally acknowledged, such that no state
can assert an exclusive right therein.
64. Article IV freezes the stances of all the parties on the territorial claims and prohibits
new claims or enlargement of existing claims. Article X mandates efforts to prevent activities
in contravention of .the principles of the Treaty. This would seem to include a mandate to
refrain from asserting or exercising sovereignty since the sovereignty issue is in dispute and
the purpose of the Treaty is international cooperation.
65. P. JEssuP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 36. For the various functions of the
Commission, see id. at 36-38.
[Vol. 33:489
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
limited fines)." Cases were to be tried before an international com-
missioner of the police, with appeal to the Commission as court of
last resort. The protocol also provided for an international police
force. 7
The Spitzbergen protocol therefore presented the following
framework: (1) a penal code enacted by treaty (in this case by vest-
ing drafting powers in an international commission); (2) an interna-
tional criminal tribunal and court of appeal; and (3) an interna-
tional police force. No facet of the plan was dependent upon or
connected with sovereignty; that is, the jurisdiction of the tribunal
and the power of the Commission to draft the penal code were not
based on territorial sovereignty. Instead, it was founded simply on
the terms of the treaty or convention itself. Since this treaty never
went into force, it is, of course, impossible to assess the difficulties
which might have been encountered after its implementation. It is
nonetheless indicative of the fact that, for an area similar to Antarc-
tica, international cooperation in enactment of a regime unrelated
to sovereignty was possible.
Although the subject cannot be explored fully in this comment,
consideration of historical precedent for an Antarctic Criminal Code
should include at least passing reference to the International Mili-
tary Tribunals (I.M.T.) established at Nuremberg and Tokyo.6
These tribunals were international and were given the power to try
individuals0 for crimes against the international law of war."
The individuals in the Nuremberg trials were nationals of states
that were not contracting parties to the tribunal's empowering stat-
ute. The Charter of the I.M.T. at Nuremberg defined the crimes
over which the tribunal had jurisdiction, separating them into
three categories: (1) crimes against peace; (2) war crimes; and (3)
crimes against humanity. Some of the crimes enumerated in the
Charter went beyond traditional war crimes, so much so that
charges of ex post facto lawmaking have been levelled at I.M.T.
signatories .7
66. Id. at 37.
67. Id. at 38.
68. See 59 Stat. 1544 (1945).
69. See 14 DEP'T STATE BULL. 361 (1946).
70. For a discussion of individuals as proper subjects of international law amenable to
the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals, see Pella, Towards an International Crim-
inal Court, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 37, 40 (1950).
71. For an extensive listing of discussions of the extent to which war crimes were crimes
under international law before 1939, see Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 38, 42 n.14 (1947).
72. See, e.g., id. at 44. The same charge was made in the case of the trial of a Japanese
general by a United States military commission in Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion in In
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946).
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Since jurisdiction of the I.M.T. was based neither on principles
of territoriality nor of nationality, its validity has been the subject
of much scholarly debate." Alternate rationales have been sug-
gested to justify the actions of the tribunal: that the joint powers
were in the position of the government of Germany; or that each
sovereign had pooled its right to exercise universal jurisdiction over
the crimes.7' In any case, a unanimous resolution of the United
Nations General Assembly in 1946 affirmed the principles set out
in the Nuremberg Judgment and in the Charter for the tribunal."
It may therefore be suggested that the precedential value of the
I.M.T. rests on two bases. First, regardless of theoretical difficulties,
the I.M.T. did exercise de facto jurisdiction. Second, the I.M.T.
received international affirmation through the resolution of the
United Nations.
The situation in post-war Germany which occasioned establish-
ment of the I.M.T. obviously is only roughly analogous to that of
present day Antarctica. In the context of the proposed Antarctic
Criminal Code and Tribunal Treaty, however, the I.M.T. may be
cited in limited fashion for at least certain precedents despite ac-
knowledged distinctions between the two situations. An interna-
tional criminal tribunal may be enacted by treaty or international
agreement; the tribunal may be declared competent to try crimes
delineated in the agreement; and it may be considered competent
to try individuals.76
The concept of an international criminal court has been circu-
lating since early in the twentieth century.77 Such a court would try
certain international crimes, such as terrorism, genocide and war
crimes. In 1951, a Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction
was appointed by the General Assembly." A year later the commit-
tee submitted a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court.7
73. See, e.g., R. WoErzEL, THE NUREMBERGO TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1960); Wright,
supra note 71, at 38.
74. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 71, at 51.
75. G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946).
76. It is recognized that the I.M.T. may have been intended for very limited purposes
and that it may be argued that it was addressed to the atrocities committed during World
War II. Once an event has been fixed historically by the passage of time, however, the scope
and direction of its use as precedent for other events has passed beyond the control of its
participants. The I.M.T. at least arguably stands for the propositions set forth in text and
that is sufficient to establish its potential precedential value. For a discussion of the I.M.T.
as precedent, see R. WoErzEL, supra note 73, at 91-92.
77. See Wright, supra note 71, at 60.
78. U.N. Doc. A/AC.48/4 (1951).
79. Reprinted in 46 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 1 (1952). For discussions of the concept of an
international criminal court, see Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal
Jurisdiction (memorandum submitted by the Secretary General), U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/7/Rev.
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Although never adopted, the statute reflects an international recog-
nition of the viability of;international criminal tribunals and an
embryonic willingness to-disassociate the notions of sovereignty and
criminal jurisdiction.
B. Jurisdictional Basis
The situation in Antarctica is unique. It is the last landmass
not subject to an internationally recognized sovereign. Furthermore,
it has been formally recognized in the international community as
an area in which international cooperation and peace should pre-
vail. The situation in Antarctica is sui generis; likewise, solutions
to various Antarctic problems, including that of control of criminal
conduct, will necessarily be novel. Such solutions, while they may
draw loosely upon precedents, legal principles and currently recog-
nized international law, may not be rigidly confined by the past.
The proposed Antarctic Criminal Code and Tribunal Treaty,
for example, purports to construct criminal jurisdiction without a
framework of territoriality or territorial sovereignty. Such a treaty
is intended to implement control of criminal behavior, while pre-
serving the atmosphere of international cooperation fostered by the
Antarctic Treaty. With such unique parameters, formation of an
Antarctic Criminal Code and Tribunal Treaty must perforce be
innovative.
Abandoning, as it must, any territorial principles upon which
to base the tribunal's jurisdiction, the treaty must look to other
jurisdictional bases. Initially, the treaty, like the Nuremberg agree-
ment, need make no reference to jurisdictional principles. The
treaty should simply declare that its tribunals shall have jurisdic-
tion over certain enumerated crimes. The discussion of jurisdic-
tional principles which follows is largely for theoretical purposes or
in anticipation of a possible jurisdictional challenge after enact-
ment.
Of the five generally recognized jurisdictional principles, 80 terri-
toriality has been rejected as divisive and inappropriate, and the
passive personality and protective principles are virtually irrele-
vant. Thus, only two of the traditional five principles remain for
discussion-nationality and universality.
The nationality principle has possible applicability to an Ant-
arctic criminal tribunal. Since each state has unquestioned jurisdic-
1 (1949); Finch, An International Criminal Court: The Case Against Its Adoption, 38 A.B.A.
J. 644 (1952); Golt, The Necessity of an International Court of Criminal Justice, 6 WASHBURN
L.J. 13 (1966); Wright, supra note 71.
80. See notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra.
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tion over its own nationals, each state may, by treaty, delegate that
jurisdiction to another entity under the terms of the treaty.
A similar delegation of jurisdiction, for instance, is approxi-
mated by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement." The agreement
works as follows:
The country (receiving state) in which troops of another
(sending state) are stationed concedes to the sending state the
right to try by court martial within its borders members of its
armed forces for violations of its military law. However, the re-
ceiving state has the right to try such persons for violations of its
law in its ordinary courts.
Conflicts of jurisdiction in cases of acts illegal under both
laws are provided for in the following way. [Priority of jurisdic-
tion is set according to whether the crime was committed in the
performance of an official duty.] Each country may waive its
primary jurisdiction."
Any waiver of primary jurisdiction by the sending state is essentially
an assignment of jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal pursuant to terms
of a treaty.
The Convention on Genocide, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1946,83 defined certain acts as crimes under
international law and contemplated an international penal tribunal
to assert jurisdiction over individuals committing those acts. The
Convention also granted jurisdiction over nationals to a foreign tri-
bunal pursuant to treaty. Although the jurisdiction of the interna-
tional penal tribunal, as contemplated by the Genocide Convention,
would rest on universality principles, it nonetheless incorporates the
notion that a state has agreed by treaty to a diminution of its juris-
diction over its nationals.
Jurisdiction of the Antarctic criminal tribunal could thus be
derived from the surrender by each signatory of jurisdiction over its
nationals. Any difficulty concerns the converse; nationals of nonsig-
natories would not be subject to the tribunal's jurisdiction. While,
in practice, jurisdictional challenges on this basis might be nullified
by the tribunal's de facto control, the theoretical gaps would not
thereby be filled. Consequently, the nationality principle is only
partially effective in supplying jurisdictional underpinnings for the
Antarctic criminal tribunal.
81. [19511 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
82. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 823 (1968).
83. Text in G.A. Res. 260(Ifl)A, 32 U.N. GAOR Sess. (1), Resolutions, at 174; U.N. Doc.
No. A/810, reprinted in 45 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 7 (1951). The Convention entered into force
in 1951, but the United States has not ratified it.
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1. THE UNIVERSALITY PRINCIPLE
The universality principle may be extended to cover the situa-
tion in Antarctica. Foundation of the jurisdiction of an Antarctic
criminal tribunal upon the universality principle would set its limits
according to the following definition: if the action is one which is a
crime under international law, the competence to prosecute and
punish may be founded simply upon a lawful custody of the person
charged with the offense."' Presence of the individual before the
Antarctic criminal tribunal, regardless of the individual's national-
ity, would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction if the crime were a
crime under international law. To be effective, the contemplated
penal code must therefore establish the enumerated offenses as
crimes under international law.
There are two possible justifications for this approach. The first
is that the principles underlying the process by which certain crimes
are considered to be universal comport with the principles inspiring
the enactment of an Antarctic penal code. If so, the offenses enu-
merated therein should also trigger jurisdiction based on universal-
ity. The second justification assumes that because the Antarctic
Criminal Code is enacted by treaty, it is ipso facto international
law.
2. INTERNATIONAL OR UNIVERSAL CRIMES
Scholars are not in accord in expressing the principles which
underlie international recognition of the universality principle.
Nonetheless, reference is necessary to various scholarly comments
on the universality principle. Discussion of the piracy problem will
be presented first since it is the most notorious crime subject to
universality jurisdiction.
The most comprehensive and familiar compilation of materials
on the subject-the Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime and Commentary8 -provides the following ex-
planation for universal jurisdiction over piracy:
Originating in a period when piratical depredations were a
very real menace to all water-borne commerce and traffic, the
competence to prosecute and punish for piracy was commonly
explained by saying that the pirate who preyed upon all alike was
the enemy of all alike . . . . The competence is perhaps better
justified at the present time upon the ground that the punishable
acts are committed upon the seas where all have an interest in
84. See Harvard Research, supra note 31, at 564.
85. Id.
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the safety of commerce and where no State has territorial juris-
diction."
The relevance of this reasoning to Antarctica is clear: all have an
interest, as declared by international treaty, in the safety of scien-
tific exploration and research in Antarctica, and certainly no state
has uncontested territorial jurisdiction. 7
Some commentators assert that in the face of international
conventions which recognize certain crimes, when the issue becomes
trial and punishment, some departure from traditional principles of
national criminal jurisdiction, including territoriality of crimes, is
permissible."8 Were this approach to be accepted universally, there
would be no difficulty in characterizing offenses against an Antarc-
tic Criminal Code as international crimes.
Two trends of thought seem to stem from the commentaries on
international crime. One, centering on piracy, holds that universal
jurisdiction arises because the locus of the offense, the sea, is beyond
territorial competence and the offense itself disrupts an interna-
tional interest in safety of commerce. These similarities to the Ant-
arctic situation have already been noted. The other trend, exempli-
fied by conventions on genocide and slavery, presupposes a state of
affairs which is generally abhorrent to civilized states and which is
unlikely to be corrected nationally. The currently available alterna-
tives in Antarctica-lawlessness or triggering international disputes
through national attempts at law enforcement-are similarly unat-
tractive to civilized states and are unlikely to be corrected nation-
ally or territorially.
3. TREATY AS INTERNATIONAL LAW
The second way to establish that offenses against the Antarctic
Criminal Code are international crimes is to aver that the code is
international law because it is enacted by multilateral treaty. As far
back as 1935, this notion had sufficient proponents to be included
in the Harvard Draft Code.8" The principle has had forty years to
86. Id. at 566. See also H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 82, at 811.
87. See also Kuhn, The Genocide Convention and States Rights 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 498,
500 (1949).
88. Golt, supra note 79, at 21.
89. Finally, there are those who would assert a jurisdiction, comparable to
that over piracy, with respect to all crimes which States have agreed by treaty to
repress. . . . In short, proponents of this view would adopt international coopera-
tion for the repression of certain crimes as the test for determining whether there
is to be a universal jurisdiction with respect to such crimes on the same basis as
in case of piracy. If a list of such crimes is to be undertaken, this is perhaps the
soundest basis for selection; but it can hardly be said that any such principle of
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mature and could find felicitous application in the situation in Ant-
arctica. It has also been asserted:
[T]here are three standards for determining that an act is an
international crime for which an individual may be held responsi-
ble: (1) if it is confirmed as such by customary international law
and the practice of states, as with piracy and war crimes; (2) if
it is established as such by treaty or international agreement, as
for example, the conventions against opium traffic; and (3) if it
constitutes a violation of fundamental principles of justice."°
Since the Antarctic Criminal Code would be enacted by multilateral
treaty, offenses against that code could properly be characterized as
international crimes for which any criminal, regardless of national-
ity, may be prosecuted by any state and by an Antarctic criminal
tribunal.
A final suggestion regarding theoretical bases for jurisdiction is
that none of the traditional principles is clearly applicable or appro-
priate for an Antarctic criminal court. An alternate approach to
strained application of old principles is simply to formulate new
ones. The following rationales could be considered as motivating the
Antarctic Criminal Code and Tribunal Treaty: (1) under present
conditions, the international community must tolerate either law-
lessness or international dispute; (2) both conditions are interna-
tionally disruptive; (3) it is universally recognized in human society
that some law is better than no law; (4) accordingly, by multilateral
treaty, states may specify what offenses shall be deemed impermis-
sible and may establish trial and enforcement mechanisms. The
jurisdiction of a tribunal so established would be based on the prin-
ciple that were its jurisdiction not recognized, lawlessness-a uni-
versally deplored condition-would prevail.
These theoretical jurisdictional difficulties may eventually be
of no practical importance. Were the treaty enacted, it has been
suggested that any jurisdictional challenges would leave it
"incumbent upon the challenger to demonstrate that the claim vio-
lates an international standard; the claimant does not have to prove
a rule of law in support of each claim."'" Thereafter, absent a show-
ing that a state's exercise of its jurisdiction would fill a legal void,
the totality of the circumstances would favor the recognition of
treaty jurisdiction.
international law has yet matured.
Harvard Research, supra note 31, at 21.
90. R. WoErrzEL, supra note 73, at 110 (emphasis added).
91. Taubenfeld, States and Offenses Committed Beyond Their Borders, 16 N.Y.L.F. 592,
599-600 (1970).
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4. STRUCTURE
Only a rough outline for the structure of an Antarctic criminal
justice system need be suggested here since practical considerations
would supply the details. It is anticipated that such a system would
be funded by a common treasury established by the Antarctic Crim-
inal Code and Tribunal Treaty signatories. Additional funding
could be derived from collection of fines imposed as penalties for
criminal code violations.
All positions should be filled by appointees nominated by
treaty signatories. The number of tribunals and positions should be
determined by reference to expedience and need. Leaving the
quantities flexible, the positions should include a trial judge, a pros-
ecutor, a defense attorney, and a magistrate. In addition, some type
of pretrial confinement facilities would be necessary, particularly
for perpetrators of violent crimes.
Any sentences entailing incarceration should be served in the
offender's state of nationality if that state is a signatory.2 If the
offender were a national of a nonsignatory, his sentence would have
to be served in the prisons of a signatory state. Furthermore, any
signatory that fails to enforce such a sentence when its convicted
national is sent home would thereafter lose the privilege of punish-
ing its own nationals. These measures, when incorporated into the
treaty, would encourage states to become signatories to the treaty
and to cooperate in furthering the enforcement.
A board of clemency should be established to handle appeals
92. Ratification of the Mexican-Canadian prisoner exchange treaty by the United States
will provide some indication of political and legal considerations to be taken into account in
drafting such a scheme. See U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975-76).
First, while the Senate is required to pass on all treaties, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2,
approval of the House of Representatives would also be necessary because the treaty would
define international criminal acts and provide punishment therefor. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 10. Such a ratification process may not only delay the effective date of a treaty but would
also require a proposal which would satisfy both houses of Congress.
Second, under the proposed plan, United States citizens would probably be afforded
habeas corpus rights while serving sentences in United States jails after having been sent-
enced in Antarctica. Such review of the tribunal's decisions with strict due process standards
should be evaluated beforehand, in order to preclude the undermining of a delicate interna-
tional framework.
These are considerations that must be addressed, but which are beyond the scope of this
article. See generally Schwartz, Rights and Remedies in the Federal District Courts of Mexico
and the United States, 4 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 67 (1977); Stotzky & Swan, Due Process
Methodology and Prisoner Exchange Treaties: Confronting an Uncertain Calculus, 62 MINN.




from the trial courts . 3 Since the appellate docket would be small,
defendants would not be subject to lengthy delays in appellate hear-
ings. A possible method for formation of the board of clemency
would be to permit each signatory to submit the name of a person
expected to be making an extended stay in Antarctica. The board
could be drawn from those nominees. The board of clemency would
be a court of last resort and its disposition of cases final. 4
Sufficient provision for procedural safeguards would have to be
included in the draft of the treaty so that at least fundamental
fairness would be assured. One model, suggested by the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement,95 would provide that a defendant prose-
cuted under the jurisdiction of the Antarctic criminal tribunal
would be entitled to rights equivalent to the fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights of the Constitution of the United States. Another pro-
posed international model for achieving at least minimum proce-
dural due process may be found in Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." The Charter
of the I.M.T. at Nuremberg had a similar provision for detailed
procedures to ensure a fair trial for defendants. 7 Sufficient safe-
guards of personal rights would achieve two goals: assuring a civi-
lized system for dispensation of justice, and allaying the qualms of
potential signatories connected with partial surrender of jurisdiction
over their nationals.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As long as the territorial claims in Antarctica remain unre-
solved, some interim measures are necessary for control of criminal
conduct. At the minimum, an Antarctic Criminal Code should be
drafted and enacted domestically by all interested states. Such
a code, as suggested above, would delineate uniform standards of
behavior appropriate for conditions in Antarctica, and would pro-
93. For crimes tried locally in Spitzbergen, it was contemplated that the internationally
appointed Commission would serve as a court of last resort. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENiELD, supra
note 2, at 37-38.
94. Allowance for jurisdictional review by the International Court of Justice, or any other
body, would only undermine the board's efficacy. So long as adequate protection is afforded
in the Antarctic courts, no such review would be necessary.
95. [19511 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67, 80 art. VII(9).
96. G.A. Res. 2200 A, Annex, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
reprinted in 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 875-76 (1967).
97. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L.
Supp. 257, 262 (1945).
98. For a discussion of the standards of justice which might be considered necessary by
the United States, see Finch, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J.
INT'L L. 89, 94 (1952).
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vide uniform sanctions for all infractions.
The present status of territorial irresolution only exacerbates
the tension prompted by criminal incidents. Implementation of a
jurisdictional scheme based on nationality through amendment to
the Antarctic Treaty could enhance control over criminal conduct,
although it leaves unresolved many of the practical problems en-
tailed in prosecution and enforcement. Formation of a condomi-
nium would provide the crucial lawmaking authority, were the
claimant states willing to abrogate exclusive claims of sovereignty.
The Antarctic Treaty establishes precedent for the area by con-
structing a unique regime of international cooperation. That regime
separates a universal goal-furtherance of scientific knowl-
edge-from the divergent goals born of the territorial claims. An
Antarctic Criminal Code and Tribunal Treaty may similarly be able
to disengage a universal goal-maintenance of order through control
of criminal conduct-from the territorial claims dispute.
As with any novel proposition, the Antarctic Criminal Code
and Tribunal Treaty is attended by certain theoretical difficulties
which may impede ratification. It could nonetheless prove to be a
practical and workable system that would foster international co-
operation in Antarctica.
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